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Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of 
Terror. By Michael Vincent Hayden. New York: Penguin Press, 
2016. ISBN: 9781594206566. Index. Pp. xiv, 448. $30.00.  
 
Playing to the Edge is authored by a 1980 graduate of the National 
Intelligence University (NIU), Michael Hayden, the only person ever to serve 
as head of both the National Security Agency (NSA) and Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA).  And he did this during very tumultuous times including the 
controversy over enhanced interrogation, and the security breach by the 
traitor Edward Snowden, which he describes as “the greatest hemorrhaging of 
legitimate American secrets in the history of the republic” (p. 421). Hayden 
has had a life-long career in intelligence.  In the 1980s, he served as the Air 
Force attaché in Bulgaria where he recalled that after having his car tailed for 
several hours by the Bulgarian security services, they pulled up alongside and 
motioned that it was time to get lunch.  
 
Much of the book discusses the Congress, the press, and the handling of 
numerous public controversies regarding intelligence.  These experiences 
gave him a sober view of the press. “Be careful what you tell these people.  
Some are less interested in honest dialogue than listening to rebut and accuse 
and discredit” (p. 400).  He writes about a hypothetical discussion with an 
intelligence case officer: “It’s authorized by the president [and the] attorney 
general [and] Congress” have been briefed. But “have you run it by the ACLU? 
What does the New York Times editorial Board think?” (p. 382).  But he also 
used the press.  He lauds the website, http://ciasaveslives.com (p. 397) and 
with former U. S. Attorney General Mike Mukasey published a powerful 
editorial in the Wall Street Journal. 
 
On Congress he notes that “One congressman wanted to know whether or not 
CIA complied with ‘buy America’ legal requirements for construction 
materials used in black sites overseas” (p. 229).  Advice for briefing Senator 
Wyden: “Speak slowly” (p. 183). He often expresses frustration. “There are 
days when a director of CIA is inclined to think that he is running a large 
public affairs, legal, and legislative liaison enterprise attached to small 
operational and analytic elements” (p.232).   
 
Hayden covers NSA controversies surrounding the Prism and Stellarwind 
programs and his book is full of details regarding how public policy was 
discussed and decided.  The same is done on the CIA side, where enhanced 
interrogation and targeted killings stormed into the public debate.  He has 
clear and compelling views on these matters.  On enhanced interrogation: 
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“[T]he facts of the case are that the use of these techniques against these 
terrorists made us safer. It really did work” (p. 386).  He similarly opines that 
“[T]he targeted killing program has been the most precise application of 
firepower in the history of armed conflict” (p. 341).  Further, he believes that 
“The United States will need to keep this capacity and be willing to use it” (p. 
344).  He expresses irony concerning the prohibition of CIA detentions: “We 
had finally succeeded in making it so legally difficult and so politically 
dangerous to grab and hold someone that we would simply default to the kill 
switch to take terrorists off the battlefield” (p. 242).  
 
The book does not go into detail regarding operations. Hayden doesn’t “talk.”  
He devotes an entire chapter on intelligence thinking surrounding the 
bombing of the North Korean-built nuclear reactor near Al-Kibir, Syria, but 
never mentions who did it.  This fits with his general view of the value of 
secrecy. “Espionage thrives in the shadows, and secrecy is an essential 
component of its success.  Despite a latent plus side (legitimacy, support, 
understanding), American intelligence has traditionally judged the minus side 
of going public (decreased effectiveness) be determinative” (p. 422). He 
repeats the advice Richard Helms gave to Robert Gates: “Never go home at 
night without asking yourself, ‘Where is the mole?’” (p. 278). 
 
Playing to the Edge is full of interesting anecdotes and descriptions of notable 
persons. President Bush liked to call him “Mikey” as in “Mikey, get in here!” 
(p. 372). On Attorney General Holder: “messianic in his focus, politically 
tone-deaf, and indifferent to contrary evidence and views” (p. 395).  On John 
McCain: “…the election of John McCain would have been more disruptive to 
the way American produced intelligence than the election of Barack Obama” 
(p. 354).  He describes Rahm Emanuel, Chief of Staff, congratulating CIA on 
the targeted killing of an al-Qaeda member (p. 342).  He notes of Abdullah II 
of Jordan that “when the king is in the United States, he motorcycles our back 
roads in the company of a close American friend, a former CIA senior” (p. 
322).  On King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia views of Iran, Hayden notes: “cut off 
the head of the snake” (p. 320).  As for Obama and Netanyahu: “I suspected 
that the two men talked past each other” (p. 299).  Director Leon Panetta 
trying to encourage CIA employees potentially threatened by release of 
information regarding enhanced interrogation was like a “pep rally in the 
Führer bunker” (p. 382).  On former CIA directors “It would be hard to get 
them all to agree that a certain day was Tuesday” (p. 393).  On angling to start 
briefing candidate Obama “we would work to get access to him and then 
create as many of what we crudely called ‘aw, shit’ moments as possible” (p. 
356). On the Iranians: “They will cheat, of course.  It’s what they do” (p. 309). 
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On the head of Afghan National Directorate of Security when visiting Colonial 
Williamsburg: “Where are the walls?” “Walls?” “Yes.  To protect them from 
the people” (p.316).  
 
Regarding NSA, he mentions “the director’s massive conference table, which 
looks like it was ripped off the set of Dr. Strangelove” (p. 172).  He describes a 
secret visit to Pakistan with Mike McConnell.  Upon departure, their jet 
needed to get fuel: “The crew had forgotten their government credit card—you 
can’t make this stuff up—and the Pakistanis wouldn’t budge” (p. 348).  So the 
DCI and DNI were sitting on the tarmac in Pakistan with empty fuel tanks. 
 
He describes National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) as having an “…arcane 
style [and] language” (p. 297).  But he himself has a quirky habit of adding the 
word “period” to the end of sentences, as in: “This does not authorize the 
collection of content, period” (p. 408), referring to the 215 program; “[O]ff the 
table. Period.” (p.381); and “[W]aterboarding . . . hadn’t been used for almost 
five years. Period” (p. 242). 
 
Playing to the Edge is a valuable insiders account of how the intelligence 
community navigated through difficult years during the Bush and Obama 
administrations.  It is primarily about the practical handling of public 
controversy and the nature of the public debate regarding the role of 
intelligence in American society.  So it is perfect reading for anyone interested 
in public policy.  In addition, it provides a bird’s eye view of challenges faced 
by managers in intelligence, and some of the practical ways to handle reform.  
 
General Hayden ultimately is an optimist.  And he believes in people.  In spite 
of all the challenges to the intelligence community, he writes that “Good 
people overcome imperfect structures” (p. 178).  But don’t look to him for any 
leaks about intelligence.  That’s not what he does.  
 
Edward Roche 
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